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In third generation currency crises models, balance sheet losses from currency 
depreciations propagate the crises into the real sector of the economy. To test 
these models, we built a firm-level database that allowed us to measure currency 
mismatches around the 2002 Brazilian currency crisis. We found that between 
2001  and  2003,  firms  with  large  currency  mismatches  just  before  the  crisis 
reduced their investment rates 8.1 percentage points more than other publicly held 
firms. We also showed that the currency depreciation increased exporters revenue, 
but those with currency mismatches reduced investments 12.5 percentage points 
more  than  other  exporters.  These  estimated  reductions  in  investment  are 
economically very significant, underscoring the importance of negative balance 
sheet effects in currency crises. 
JEL Classification: F32; F34; G31; G32 
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1. Introduction 
The  international  financial  crises  in  the  1990s  that  struck  many  emerging  countries 
inspired a group of models designed to explain currency crises based on firms’ decisions. 
Called  third  generation  currency  crisis  models,  they  focus  on  the  post-devaluation  losses 
suffered by firms with unhedged foreign debt. In imperfect capital markets, these negative 
balance sheet effects tighten credit restrictions, leading to a reduction in investments that, 
according to third  generation  models, propels the currency crisis  into the  economy’s  real 
sector (Krugman, 1999; Aghion et al., 2001).
1  
To evaluate third generation models, recent literature has used firm-level information, 
estimating  the  impact  on  investment  of  balance  sheet  changes  due  to  exchange  rate 
movements. However, while in some studies firms that hold more dollar debt invest less in 
the wake of currency devaluation, others studies identify non-significant – or even positive – 
effects of the balance sheet losses on investment.
2  
As a rule, the results’ ambiguity is partly due to limited data: in general, the use of foreign 
currency hedge instruments is only reported in the explanatory notes of financial statements. 
This limitation means that empirical works often disregard hedge instruments and use dollar 
debt  as  a  proxy  for  currency  mismatches.  Consequently  they  overestimate  currency 
mismatches and underestimate the impact of currency losses on the firms’ investments, a bias 
that should vary in different countries depending on firms’ hedging vehicles.  
In  this  article,  we  test  the  transmission  mechanism  for  balance  sheet  losses  using  a 
database that allows us to measure the currency mismatches – defined as foreign currency 
debt net of foreign currency assets and derivatives – of publicly held Brazilian firms between 
2000 and 2004. This period includes the Brazilian currency crisis of 2002, which resulted in a 
53% depreciation of the real vis-à-vis the dollar. Having a currency mismatch measure, we 
may adopt an empirical strategy that focuses on the central implication of third generation 
models: the drop in investment by firms with unhedged foreign currency debt resulting from 
currency depreciation.  
If the balance sheet loss resulting from currency devaluation were the only significant 
event of 2002, the difference in investment (before and after the crisis of 2002) by firms with 
unhedged foreign debt just before the crisis would give us an estimate of the balance sheet 
effect. It is quite unlikely, however, that the balance sheet effect was the only important 
                                                
1 Hubbard (1998) reviews the literature on investment and credit market imperfections.  
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channel of the crisis of 2002. Currency crises almost always affect the economy’s relative 
prices,  for  example,  impacting  firms’  investment  propensity.  Thus,  the  difference  in 
investment by firms with currency mismatches reflects not only balance sheet effects, but also 
other consequences of the crisis, that may not be observable, but that impact all firms, as well 
as other events that happened during that period. 
There is, however, a simple way to separate balance sheet effects from other effects. The 
difference  in  investment  by  firms  without  pre-crisis  currency  mismatches  would  seem  to 
capture the full range of effects from the crisis, except for balance sheet effects. Therefore, the 
difference in investment changes by firms with and without currency mismatches provides 
estimation – called differences-in-differences – of the balance sheet effects. 
Applying this difference-in-differences method to our data supports the conclusions of 
third generation models. Adopting 2001 as the base year (the year prior to the crisis of 2002), 
the effect of the 2002 depreciation on publicly held firms that reported balance sheet losses 
was that they reduced their investment rates more than firms that did not report losses: 8.1 
percentage  points  in  2003  and  5.5  percentage  points  in  2004.  Given  that  the  average 
investment rate of all the firms was 8.1% in 2001, the significant economic impact of balance 
sheet effects is more than evident.
3 
As  we  elaborate  in  the  text,  the  estimates  for  investment  cuts  incorporate  firm 
characteristics to control any bias in selecting the firms with unhedged foreign debt (treatment 
group) and the firms without currency mismatches (control group). These two groups were 
formed in such a way that balance sheet effects would apply only to the treatment group. This 
differences-in-differences approach, however, is contingent on the reliability of the currency 
mismatch measure used to establish the treatment and control groups.  
We may strengthen the reliability of the treatment and control groups by considering a 
subset of these two groups:  export  firms.  Currency  depreciation should  not only indicate 
financial losses for firms with unhedged foreign debt, it should also mean competitive gains 
for  export  firms.  In  this  case,  the  logic  of  third  generation  models  predicts  increases  in 
investments  by  export firms,  which  should  be less  dramatic for  exporters  with  unhedged 
foreign debt. 
The results do in fact show very significant competitiveness and balance sheet effects 
following the Brazilian crisis of 2002. Between 2001 and 2003, export firms increased net 
revenue  16.8%  more  than  firms  that  did  not  export,  and  their  investment  rates  rose  7.2 
                                                
3 Our differences-in-differences approach follows Abadie (2005).  
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percentage  points  more  than  their  non-exporting  counterparts.  In  the  same  period,  and 
consistent  with  third  generation  models,  the  investment  rates  of  exporters  with  currency 
mismatches just prior to the crisis fell 12.5 percentage points more than the rates of export 
firms without currency mismatches.  
Data from the Brazilian currency  crisis of  2002 support that  there is a sharp drop in 
aggregate investment during currency crises in economies where a large number of firms have 
unhedged foreign debt. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: the next section briefly describes 
some empirical evidence on balance sheet effects; Section 3 describes the database; Section 4 
estimates the balance sheet effect of the currency depreciation of 2002 on investment rates 
and  analyzes  the  robustness  of  the  results;  Section  5  estimates  the  balance  sheet  effect 
together with the competitiveness effect of the crisis of 2002; lastly, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Existing Evidence 
The emerging market currency crises of the 1990s were characterized by dramatic drops 
in  economic  activity  and  collapsing  financial  systems.  These  crises  fueled  debate  on  the 
impact  that  currency  depreciation  had  on  economies’  performances.  Extensive  theoretical 
writing ensued, showing that when currency mismatches are present, currency devaluations 
can be contractionary, reversing the expansionary effects of the conventional open economy 
models. However, these models do not provide conclusive results. For example, Céspedes et 
al. (2002) show that depreciations are contractionary only when there are simultaneously high 
levels of foreign debt and large imperfections in the international capital markets.  
In fact, Céspedes (2004) and Galindo et al. (2003b), using macroeconomic data from a set 
of countries, found evidence that foreign debt reduces the expansionary effect of currency 
depreciations, and may even turn them contractionary in cases of high foreign debt. These 
results were not fully confirmed, however, by studies using firm-level data. Using a sample of 
firms from seven Latin American countries in the 1991-1999 period, Bleakley and Cowan 
(2002) found that firms with greater foreign currency debt invest more following periods of 
currency depreciation. On the other hand, Aguiar (2005) showed that after the Mexican crisis 
of 1994, the exporters’ investment was constrained by weak balance sheets.  
An initial attempt to reconcile these ambiguous results was made by articles that analyzed 
the  importance  of  the  balance  sheet  effects  for  six  Latin  American  countries  separately  
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(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru).
4 These articles followed the standard 
approach  of  Bleakley  and  Cowan  (2002),  but  presented  some  innovations  as  the  use  of 
dynamic panel techniques (GMM) to incorporate the covariance structure in time and address 
possible endogeneity problems of the independent variables. The evidence from these studies 
is also inconclusive. While for Mexico, Argentina, Peru and Brazil the balance sheet effects 
were negative and significant, for Colombia and Chile the balance sheet losses provoked by 
currency depreciation did not significantly impact their firms’ investments.
5  
The ambiguity continued. The most recent attempt to test balance sheet effects sought 
more precise measures for currency mismatches that would incorporate firms’ currency hedge 
positions. Cowan et al. (2005) studied the case of Chile and showed that, consistent with 
previous studies on Chile, firms with higher foreign currency debt did not invest less after 
periods of currency depreciation. However, when foreign debt was measured net of currency 
assets and derivatives, the balance sheet effects of currency depreciation became negative and 
significant.  
This  article follows  the  line  of Cowan  et  al.  (2005)  by  incorporating  currency  hedge 
positions into our measure of currency mismatches. However, our work differs from his and 
the other aforementioned articles in that it limits the sample period to the time around a 
specific  currency  crisis.  We  emphasized  building  a  control  group  of  firms  that  were  not 
subject to the balance sheet losses proposed by third generation models. As explained in the 
introduction, the control group allowed us to isolate the impact of balance sheet effects using 
only investment data around the time of the crisis. Restricting the sample period to the years 
just before and after the crisis, we lowered the risk of capturing structural breaks that would 
distort the results.
6 Additionally, the appropriate selection of control groups made it possible 
to  test  more  directly  the  impact  of  balance  sheet  effects,  for  example,  by  comparing 
investment by exporters with and without currency mismatches.  
 
                                                
4 The articles were published in a special edition of the Emerging Markets Review 2003; 4.  
5 In the case of Brazil, we adopted the results described in Bonomo et al. (2003), which is a revised version of 
the article these authors published in the Emerging Markets Review 2003.  
6 Bonomo et al. (2003), for example, argue that the negative balance sheet effects in Brazil were limited to the 
floating  exchange  rate  period  (1999-2002).  When  they  restricted  the  sample  to  the  period  1991-1999  that 
Bleakley and Cowan (2002) used, which included only one year of floating exchange rate, the balance sheet 
effects were positive.   
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3. Data Description 
3.1 Sample Period  
This study is built around the Brazilian currency crisis of 2002. In that year, the Brazilian 
exchange  rate  fell  approximately  53%  in  relation  to  the  dollar.  The  devaluation  of  the 
Brazilian currency began in April and reached its maximum in September of 2002, on the eve 
of presidential elections in which a leftist party was highly favored to win (which proved 
accurate). Firms that had heavy unhedged foreign debt suffered enormous financial losses in 
the crisis. Moreover, the cost of foreign loans rose considerably and the rollover rate for 
foreign  currency  debt  fell,  indicating  tighter  credit  restrictions.
7  These  conditions  offer  a 
natural experiment for testing the balance sheet effects predicted by third generation models. 
In  order  to  analyze  this  experiment  we  identify  a  treatment  group  formed  of  firms  that 
reported large financial losses with the currency depreciation of 2002 and a control group 
formed of firms that did not report balance sheet changes. 
After identifying the control and treatment groups, we tested the balance sheet effects 
using  the  “difference-in-differences”  method,  which  compares  the  average  difference  in 
investment rates of firms in the control and treatment groups before and after the currency 
depreciation. Implementing our econometric strategy required, however, pre-crisis data, for 
which we used only the years 2000 and 2001 to avoid contamination from the currency crisis 
of January 1999, which culminated in flexibilization of Brazil’s exchange rate regime. As 
post-crisis periods, we evaluated only the two years following the crisis (2003-2004). The 
year 2002 was not included in the sample: the currency depreciation began in April of 2002, 
which could affect the results if firms invested in the first quarter of the year. Figure 1 traces 
Brazil’s  nominal  exchange  rate  between  1997  and  2004,  particularly  the  substantial 
depreciations in January 1999 and during the second semester of 2002. 
 
                                                
7. The Central Bank of Brazil’s 2002 Annual Report shows that the rollover rate for notes and commercial 
papers fell from 83% in the second half of 2001 to 16% in the second half of 2002, while that of direct loans fell 
from 111% to 68% for the same comparison period. Although we do not have data on firms’ borrowing costs, 
the country risk, measured by the Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+), an index calculated by JP 
Morgan, shows that the premium on Brazil’s portfolio of securities over US Treasury securities with the same 
terms reached a record high of 2.436 base points on September 27, 2002. As the cost of overseas borrowing for 
firms is positively correlated with the cost of the country’s borrowing, the EMBI+ suggests there was a rise in 
loan costs for firms in 2002.   
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil 
 
3.2 Sample Selection and Database  
Once the sample period was determined, we described the sample firms. The Economática 
database served as the foundation for the sample selection.
8 From an initial sample of 477 
Brazilian publicly held firms, we established an unbalanced panel of 274 firms. We excluded 
firms in the financial and insurance sectors (43 firms); those that were not trading publicly in 
December of 2002 (125); diversified holding firms with stakes in financial firms or without 
operating revenues (26); those whose balance sheet dates were not December (2); and those 
that did not have financial statements available for our sample period (4). Three firms were 
also excluded because their balance sheets were practically identical to those of other sample 
firms in the same economic group.
9  
With the sample defined, we then obtained information on the financial variables to be 
used in our analysis: investment rate, total assets, total revenue, operating profit and bank 
debt,  the  latter  being  the  total  debt  in  foreign  currency  plus  debt  in  domestic  currency, 
including debentures. While the investment rate, total assets, total revenue, operating profit 
and debentures were obtained from the Economática database, the currency composition of 
bank  debts  and  assets  was  collected  from  the  explanatory  notes  of  consolidated  balance 
sheets.  
                                                
8 Information about Economática may be obtained at www.economatica.com. 
9 From each pair of firms with very similar balance sheets, we included the one with higher total assets.   
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We  used the firms’  consolidated financial statements instead of the controlling firms’ 
statements because many publicly held Brazilian firms are holding firms with no operating 
income or debt in foreign currency during the period analyzed.
10 Additionally, many of the 
firms  analyzed,  even  those  that are  not  holding  firms,  borrowed  overseas  or  had  foreign 
currency  assets  through  controlled  firms.  Thus,  by  consolidating  the  data  we  were  also 
analyzing the firms that are not publicly held, but were directly or indirectly controlled by the 
firms in our sample. 
To test the balance sheet effects, we measured firm performance by its gross investment 
rate, which is the sum of fixed asset variation plus depreciation divided by once lagged fixed 
assets.
11 So that  this investment measure would most accurately reflect the balance sheet 
effect of currency depreciation, we made some adjustments to our sample. First, we excluded 
30 firms that reported negative net worth before the crisis of 2002. These firms were probably 
in financial distress prior to the currency shock, which could distort their investment policies. 
We then researched news reports on each firm to identify changes in capital during the sample 
period  that  were  not  directly  related  to  currency  depreciation,  such  as  mergers  and 
acquisitions, the sale of stock holdings in subsidiaries and reassessments of fixed assets; these 
normally imply changes in assets not related to balance sheet effects.
12  
Unfortunately, we did not find standardized information on the values of capital changes 
attributed to these events. Where we found the total amount of the operations, we excluded 
the  observations (firms-year)  from the sample when the value exceeded 10% of  a firm’s 
assets, assessed at the beginning of the year in which the operation took place.
13 This criterion 
prevented  small  transactions  from  eliminating  material  information  about  the  firms’ 
investments. However this criterion may not be used in cases where the value of the stock 
transactions or asset reassessment was not reported in the news. In these cases, we avoided 
distortions of investment rates by excluding the observations in which the absolute value of 
the firms’ gross investment  rates exceeded  40%.
14  In total, analysis of firm news reports 
resulted in the exclusion of 54 observations. 
                                                
10 For example, on the balance sheets of the 274 controlling firms in the sample in 2001, 53 firms did not report 
operating revenue and 101 firms did not have foreign currency debt. Consolidating controlling firm data with 
that of their controlled firms, the number of sample firms without foreign currency debt fell from 101 to 57.  
11 We did not use capital expenditures to measure investment, as this would significantly reduce our sample size 
due to the small number of firms for which Economática has this information. 
12 This research was conducted in the news contained in the Economática database. 
13 The results of the regressions described in the following section did not change qualitatively with the use of 
lower cutoff values, such as 5% and 1% of assets. 
14 The results of the regressions described in the following section did not change qualitatively with the use of 
minimum cutoff values for investment rates equal to 30% and 50% in absolute value.  
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In addition to the financial variables, we collected import and export data on the firms in 
our sample from the Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX). These data are important to our 
study for two reasons. First, import and export data allow us to analyze the competitiveness 
effect  of  currency  depreciation, and  second, they  can  influence  currency  mismatches and 
investment decisions and are thus important variables in our econometric analysis. Both the 
export and import values were converted into domestic currency using the year’s average 
exchange rate, and like the other variables described in this section, subsequently deflated by 
the Consumer Price Index (IPCA).
15 
Lastly, we calculated the currency mismatch for each firm in our sample to identify which 
of them suffered significant balance sheet losses from the currency depreciation of 2002. We 
defined currency mismatch as debt linked to foreign currency net of foreign currency assets 
and derivatives. Data on foreign currency debt and assets were colected from the explanatory 
notes  of  the  firms’  consolidated  annual  balance  sheets,  which  were  obtained  from  the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil (CVM). Foreign currency debt was calculated 
by the sum of loans in foreign currency, commercial debts, supplier financing and foreign 
securities. Foreign currency assets were calculated as the sum of financial market investments 
in foreign currency (cash, government issues indexed to the dollar and overseas client credits). 
Positions in foreign currency derivatives reported in balance sheet notes include currency 
swaps contracted domestically or overseas as well as other currency derivatives like dollar 
options, futures and forwards.
16 However, many of the firms that report positions in foreign 
currency derivatives do not specify the amounts, but rather report only their spending and 
revenues  on  these  contracts.  Other  firms  report  positions  in  foreign  currency  derivatives 
together with positions in interest rate derivatives; in these cases we did not use this balance 
sheet information. To minimize such gaps, we complemented the data with information on 
foreign currency swaps between financial institutions and non-financial firms between 1999 
and 2002 registered with the Clearing House for the Custody and Financial Settlement of 
                                                
15  To  reconcile  SECEX  data  and  financial  data,  we  identified  the  firms  by  their  Corporate  Taxpayer 
Identification Numbers (CNPJ).
 This allowed us to consider firms with different CNPJs separately, even if they 
are in the same group. Since we used consolidated data, we also obtained import and export figures for 334 firms 
that are subsidiaries or associate firms of controlling firms in our sample. Our export measure was either the 
consolidated  export  figures  reported  in  balance  sheet  explanatory  notes  or  the  sum  of  the  exports  of  the 
controlling and controlled firms obtained from the SECEX (sum weighted by the respective stock holdings), 
whichever was greater. For imports we used only the SECEX database, since most financial statements do not 
report import spending. 
16 To accurately assess positions in currency options, we must know each option’s strike price. As this detailed 
information was unavailable for most of the firms, we considered the consolidated financial positions in options 
reported in balance sheet notes.   
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Securities (CETIP). Oliveira (2004) was the first to compile these data, based on confidential 
information from the Central Bank of Brazil.  
 
3.3 Sample Statistics 
Table 1 shows the number of sample firms each year and classifies them in one of the 
following seventeen sectors: Food and Beverages, Commerce, Civil Construction, Energy, 
Electro-electronics, Industrial Machinery, Mining, Non-metallic Minerals, Paper and Pulp, 
Oil and Gas, Chemical, Steel and Metallurgy, Telecommunications, Textiles, Transportation 
Services,  Veichles  and  parts,  and  others.
17  The  final  sample  contains  an  average  of  218 
publicly held firms in the sample period, with a maximum of 232 in 2001 and a minimum of 
197 in 2004. The main reason for this reduction between 2001 and 2004 was not the currency 
crisis of 2002, but changes in the firms’ ownership structure: all sample firms that closed their 
capital after 2002 reported positive net worth.
18  
One essential condition for our strategy to test balance sheet effects was a representative 
sample of firms with foreign debt prior to the crisis. Table 2 shows that 77.6% of our sample 
firms had debt in foreign currency in December of 2001, a percentage that changed little 
during the sample period. A more detailed analysis (not presented in the table) indicates that 
only  7.6%  of  the  firms  did  not  have  foreign  debt  throughout  the  entire  sample  period. 
However,  firms  with  foreign  debt  may  manage  exchange  risks  using  hedge  instruments 
designed to avoid losses with devaluation of the real. Table 2 shows that in December of 
2001,  53.9%  of  the  sample  firms  had  foreign  currency  assets  or  derivatives:  38.8%  had 
derivatives while 33.2% had foreign exchange assets. In addition to the hedge instruments, 
foreign currency debts may be covered by future export revenue net of imports, which could 
circumvent the credit restrictions that could imply a reduction in investment.  
 
                                                
17 The industry divisions are those used by Economática to classify publicly held Brazilian firms. As there was 
only one firm in the Agri and Fisheries sector, we included it in the Food and Beverage sector. 
18 The telecommunications sector accounted for much of the reduction in the number of sample firms. When the 
privatization of Telebrás ended in 1997, many of the privatized firms underwent corporate restructuring and 
were incorporated by the controlling firms.  
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Table 1: Number of Firms in the Sample per Sector 
 
 
Note: The firms were classified per sector based on the Economática database. From an initial sample of 477 
publicly held Brazilian firms, we selected 274 non-financial firms for the sample to be used in this article. We 
excluded  firms  in  the  financial  and  insurance  sectors  (43  firms);  those  that  were  not  trading  publicly  in 
December of 2002 (125); diversified holding firms with stakes in financial firms or that did not have operating 
revenue (26); those that did not close their fiscal year in the month of December (2); those that did not have the 
necessary testing data (4); and three firms with balance sheets practically identical to other firms in the same 
economic group. We also excluded 54 observations of firms that underwent significant capital changes, such as 
mergers and acquisitions, sale of holdings in controlled firms, or reassessment of fixed assets. 
 
In fact, Table 2 does show a significant number of exporters and importers: in December 
of 2001, 58.2% of the firms exported and 67.7% of the firms imported. As the exporters 
usually have some importing activity (but not necessarily vice-versa), it is not surprising that 
there  are  more  importers  than  exporters  in  our  sample.  However,  the  import  and  export 
figures of many of these firms account for a very small percentage of their total revenue, 
while  aggregate  figures  show  considerable  imports  and  exports  for  our  sample  firms, 
accounting  for  39.4%  of  Brazil’s  exports  and  26.5%  of  its  imports  in  2004  (figures  not 
presented in the table). 
 
Sector / Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean
Total 204 208 204 194 177 196
Food and Beverages 14 14 14 15 12 14
Commerce 9 10 10 9 8 9
Civil Construction 13 13 11 12 10 12
Electro-Electronics 9 10 9 9 8 9
Energy 27 26 26 28 26 27
Industrial Machinery 9 8 9 7 6 8
Mining 3 3 3 3 3 3
Non-Metalic Minerals 6 6 6 5 4 5
Paper and Pulp 8 9 9 9 8 9
Oil and gas 8 8 8 7 6 7
Chemical 18 18 17 16 17 17
Steel and Metallurgy 26 27 25 25 25 26
Telecommunications 19 21 23 15 13 17
Textiles 21 20 20 20 18 20
Transportation Services 2 3 2 3 1 2
Veichles and Parts 12 12 12 11 12 12
Others 20 24 24 23 20 22 
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Table 2: Characteristics of Sample Firms 
 
 
Note: This table presents the percentage of the number of firms in the sample with debt, assets and derivatives in 
foreign currency, export revenue and import expenditures each year. 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics. Just before the crisis of 2002 (December of 2001), 
firms had foreign debt equal to 14.8% of their assets. This amount implies large balance sheet 
losses after 53% currency depreciation like the one in in 2002. However, for these losses to 
negatively affect investments, these firms must not have matched their foreign currency debt 
with income linked to the exchange rate. The second and third lines of Table 3 show that the 
losses  resulting  from  foreign  currency  debt  in  2002  were  partially  offset  by  gains  from 
hedging. Foreign  currency debt in  2001 was  partially covered by  foreign  currency assets 
(3.1% of total assets) and derivatives (3.7% of total assets), reflecting an average currency 
mismatch equal to 8% of total assets.  
In 2002, average foreign currency debt and derivatives as a percentage of total assets grew 
substantially. However, at least some of this growth was due to currency depreciation, which 
impacted the value in domestic currency of these variables. After the crisis, the currency 
mismatch fell to 6.5% of total assets in 2003 and 5.6% in 2004. For the entire sample period, 
the median currency mismatch, equal to 2.6% of total assets, was far less than the 7.2% 
average, which indicates that some firms had considerable unhedged foreign debt. In fact, a 
median equal to zero foreign currencyassets and derivatives shows that over half the firms did 
not hedge their exposure in the sample period.  
Table 3 also shows that exports also rose in the period, on average accounting for 10.8% 
of total revenue while imports accounted for 3.4%. Thus, the average percentage of total 
export revenue net of imports was 7.3%. Average operating profit before tax and interest was 
8.5% of assets. The gross investment rate went from 10.7% in 2000 to 8.3% in 2001, reaching 
its 3.3% low in 2002. After the crisis, investment gradually recovered: 5.5% in 2003 and 9.4% 
in 2004. 
With foreign currency debt 77.7% 77.6% 78.1% 79.3% 77.7% 78.1%
With foreign currency assets and/or derivatives 47.3% 53.9% 61.8% 58.1% 59.4% 56.0%
With foreign currency assets 30.4% 33.2% 37.7% 41.0% 41.1% 36.5%
With foreign currency derivatives 28.1% 38.8% 46.9% 35.5% 35.0% 37.0%
With export revenues 59.8% 58.2% 58.3% 60.4% 57.9% 58.9%
With import expenditures 71.9% 67.7% 67.5% 64.5% 65.5% 67.5%
Characteristic of firms / Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics on the firms during the sample period. Foreign currency debt 
was  calculated  as  the  sum  of  all  debts  indexed  to  or  denominated  in  foreign  currency,  whether  borrowed 
domestically or overseas. Foreign currency assets were calculated as the sum of financial market investments in 
foreign currency, mainly cash, government issues indexed to the dollar and overseas client credits. Foreign 
currency  derivatives  include  positions  in  swaps  contracted  domestically  or  overseas  and  positions  in  other 
foreign exchange derivatives such as dollar options, futures and forwards. Currency mismatches were measured 
by the total foreign currency debt net of foreign currency assets and derivatives. Exports were measured by 
either the consolidated export figures reported in balance sheet explanatory notes or the sum of the exports of the 
controlling and controlled firms obtained from the SECEX (sum weighted by the respective stock holdings), 
whichever was greater. Imports were calculated by the value of import spending by controlling and controlled 
firms (weighted according to their respective holdings), obtained from SECEX. Both exports and imports were 
converted into domestic currency using the average exchange rate of each year. Net exports are exports net of 
imports. The investment rate is defined as (K (t) – K (t-1) + depreciation) / K (t-1), where the capital stock (K) is 
defined as fixed assets net of depreciation. Total debt was calculated by the sum of the value of loans and 
financing in foreign currency and in domestic currency, including debentures. Operating profit was taken before 
tax and interest. Total revenue and total assets were converted into dollars using the exchange rates at the end of 
each year. 
 
In terms of firm size (total assets and total operating revenue), the sample is highly varied 
because there were few large firms. While the median firm had total assets of 131 million 
dollars and revenue of 294 million, average total assets and average total revenue were equal 
to US$ 1.5 billion and US$ 1.0 billion, respectively. In terms of financial leverage measured 
by the percentage of total debt over total assets, the sample was not so disparate, with an 
average and median of 26.9 and 26.3%, respectively. 
 
 
Variable / Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean Median
Foreign currency debt / Total asset 14.1% 14.8% 17.2% 14.7% 11.9% 14.6% 10.8%
Foreign currency asset / Total asset 2.3% 3.1% 3.8% 3.7% 3.3% 3.2% 0.0%
Foreign currency derivatives / Total asset 2.1% 3.7% 7.6% 4.5% 3.0% 4.2% 0.0%
Currency mismatch / Total asset 9.8% 8.0% 5.8% 6.6% 5.6% 7.2% 2.6%
Exports / Total revenue 10.3% 10.4% 10.2% 11.3% 11.7% 10.8% 1.0%
Imports / Total revenue 3.7% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.5% 3.4% 0.4%
Net exports / Total revenue 6.5% 7.2% 6.9% 8.0% 8.2% 7.3% 0.0%
Operational profit / Total asset 7.1% 8.1% 8.6% 8.1% 10.7% 8.5% 8.5%
Investment rate 10.7% 8.3% 3.3% 5.5% 9.4% 7.4% 3.7%
Total revenue (US$ million) 1086 1.038 775 1.052 1.278 1.046 294
Total asset (US$ million) 1.774 1.598 1.161 1.430 1.418 1.476 131
Total debt / Total asset 25.5% 26.8% 29.5% 27.8% 24.9% 26.9% 26.3% 
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4. Balance Sheet Effects  
In the previous section, we provided evidence of the aggregate level of large currency 
mismatches just before the currency crisis of 2002. These currency mismatches lead to severe 
balance  sheet  losses  in  the  event  of  currency  devaluation.  According  to  third  generation 
models, these losses induce credit restrictions that in turn force firms to abandon investment 
projects.  
In this section, we identify which firms presented foreign currency mismatches prior to 
the crisis of 2002 and test whether these firms (our treatment group) reduced their investments 
more than firms that did not report post-crisis balance sheet changes because they did not 
have currency mismatches (our control group). 
 
4.1 Treatment and Control Groups  
Table 4 shows that, in fact, a large percentage of firms had large currency mismatches in 
December of 2001. For example, 25% of the firms had currency mismatches exceeding 12% 
of assets, and 10% of the firms had currency mismatches exceeding 25% of their assets. On 
the other hand, some firms had null or negative currency mismatches. Statistics not given in 
the  tables  identify  33  firms  (14.2%  of  the  total)  with  positions  in  currency  assets  or 
derivatives  exceeding  their  foreign  currency  debt,  and  another  53  firms  (22.8%)  without 
currency mismatches in 2001, because they were either perfectly matched or reported no 
foreign currency positions on their balance sheets. Thus our sample contains a considerable 
number of firms that reported heavy losses from the crisis of 2002 and a large number that did 
not report losses. 
To estimate the balance sheet effects of currency depreciation on firms’ investment, we 
would ideally compare investment rates by firms that reported losses with their investment 
figures when there was no crisis (counterfactual). Unfortunately, there is no information on 
how much these firms would have invested if the crisis had not occurred. To address this 
problem, we compared the investment rate changes (before and after the crisis) of firms that 
reported losses from the crisis due to currency mismatches (treatment group) and firms that 
reported no crisis-related balance sheet changes (control group). The control group’s average 
investment change thus gives us a way to replicate the counterfactual. To ensure that this 
counterfactual is accurate, we must then monitor possible selection differences between firms 
with and without currency mismatches.  
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Note: This table presents the distribution of currency mismatching on total assets of the sample firms in the year 
2001, just before the currency crisis of 2002. The currency mismatch is measured by foreign currency debts net 
of foreign currency assets and derivatives.  
 
Table 5 presents the results of tests of differences in averages of characteristics of the 
firms with and without mismatches just before the currency crisis of 2002. The group with 
mismatches  has  102  firms  while  the  control  group  has  130.  The  group  of  firms  with 
mismatches includes all the firms that in 2001 had currency mismatches exceeding 5.3% of 
their assets. This cutoff value was chosen in such a way that the control group firms had an 
average currency mismatch over assets equal to zero.  
The first line of Table 5 shows there was no statistically significant difference in the two 
groups’ investment rates: the firms with mismatches invested an average of 7.6%, compared 
to  the  8.9%  of  firms  without  mismatches.  The  average  currency  mismatch  of firms  with 
mismatches was 18.4% of assets in 2001, a level that results in average losses of nearly 10% 
of assets after a 53% currency shock like the one in 2002.  
Firms  with  mismatches  had  a  larger  percentage  of  revenue  from  exports,  12.6%  as 
compared to the 8.7% of firms without mismatches, but the difference in averages is not 
statistically significant. The average difference in import figures between the groups was only 
0.3% of revenue, firms with mismatches being slightly ahead. On average, the firms with 
mismatches  reported  export  revenue  net  of  imports  equal  to  9.2%  of  total  revenue,  as 
compared  to  5.5%  of  the  matched  firms.  This  difference  in  averages,  however,  is  not 
significant  to 10% (p-value  of 0.111). The groups presented  no significant  differences in 
operating profit. In terms of size, the firms in the treatment group (with mismatches) were 
considerably larger than the firms in the control group. On average, the logarithms of the net 
revenue and assets of mismatched firms were equal to 13.6 and 14.1 as compared to the 
matched firms’ 12.7 and 13.2. The mismatched firms were also significantly more leveraged, 
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with debt of 36.3% of assets  as compared  to 19.4% of the group  with matches. Foreign 
currency debt largely accounted for this leverage difference, as both groups reported average 
domestic indebtedness of around 12% of assets.  
In summary, the results in Table 5 show that the groups of firms with mismatches differed 
significantly from firms without mismatches, not only in terms of currency mismatches, but 
also in terms of size and leverage. 
 
Table 5: Financial characteristics of firms with and without currency mismatches in 2001 
 
 
Note: Selected summary statistics for firms with and without mismatches in 2001, just before the crisis of 2002. 
The investment rate is defined as (K (t) – K (t-1) + depreciation) / K (t-1), where the capital stock (K) is defined 
as fixed assets net of depreciation. The currency mismatch is defined as foreign currency debt net of foreign 
currency assets and derivatives. The firms classified as having mismatches are those with currency mismatches 
exceeding 5.3% of their assets in 2001. We chose this cutoff value for the mismatched group so that the control 
group would have an average currency mismatch over assets equal to zero. Exports and imports were converted 
into domestic currency using the average exchange rate for each year. Net exports are exports net of imports. 
Operating profits were calculated before tax and interest. Total debt was calculated by the sum of the value of 
financing and loans in foreign currency and in domestic currency, including debentures. The far right column 
shows the differences in means and the p-values for tests of equality of means with different variances between 







Variables Mean Median Mean Median
Investment rate 7.6% 2.9% 8.9% 6.0%
-1.3%           
(0.589)
Currency mismatch / Total asset 18.4% 15.0% 0.0% 0.0%
18.4%***    
(0.000)
Exports / Total revenue 12.6% 3.9% 8.7% 0.0%
3.8%         
(0.111)
Imports / Total revenue 3.4% 1.0% 3.1% 0.1%
0.3%              
(0.742)
Net exports / Total revenue 9.2% 0.5% 5.5% 0.0%
3.7%          
(0.111)
Operational profit / Total asset 8.4% 8.4% 7.9% 8.2%
0.4%           
(0.712)
Log total revenue  13.6 13.9 12.7 12.7
0.9***     
(0.000)
Log total assets  14.1 14.2 13.2 13.0
0.9***        
(0.000)
Total debt / Total asset 36.3% 35.6% 19.4% 16.3%
17.0%***          
(0.000)
Domestic debt / Total asset 12.3% 11.3% 11.8% 6.9%
0.5%         
(0.753)
Groups of Firms Mismatched (N=102) Matched (N=130)  Mean 
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4.2 Methodology and Results  
In order to test whether the currency crisis caused firms with currency mismatches to 
reduce their investments more than firms without currency mismatches, we conducted two 
sets of tests. The first was based on the differences-in-differences method and the second on 
propensity  score  matching.  These  methods  of  estimation  are  used  in  studies  designed  to 
evaluate the effectiveness of a specific exogenous intervention policy, estimating the policy’s 
average effect (treatment) on the individuals affected (treated) by the policy.
19 In our study, 
the treated firms are those that had large currency mismatches in the period immediately prior 
to the currency depreciation of 2002, that is to say those that were (negatively) impacted by 
the currency depreciation. The treatment effect is the impact on investment of losses resulting 
from the currency depreciation.  
 
4.2.1 Differences-in-differences 
The differences-in-differences approach estimates the balance sheet effect of the currency 
crisis on investment by the difference in average investment rate changes (before and after the 
crisis of 2002) of two groups of firms. One group had crisis-related balance sheet losses 
because they had unhedged foreign currency debts (treatment group), and the other group 
reported no losses (control group). The differences-in-differences estimator is as follows: 
 
.
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control i control i treatment i treatment i , (1) 
 
where  Y(i,t)  is  the  investment  rate  of  firm  i  in  year  t,  M  is  the  number  of firms  in  the 
treatment group (firms that reported crisis-related losses) and N is the number of firms in the 
control group (firms that did not report losses).  
The idea of the differences-in-differences estimator is quite simple. If the balance sheet 
losses resulting from currency depreciation were the only significant event of the year 2002 
that impacted investment, we could estimate this impact simply by the changes in investment 
rates  (before  and  after  the  crisis)  of  firms  with  currency  mismatches  (treatment  group). 
However, since it is highly unlikely that the balance sheet effect was the only significant 
                                                
19 Some examples of intervention policies tested in empirical studies are aid programs, training, tax credits and 
unemployment insurance policies.   
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event  in  2002,  we  deduced  the  control  group’s  investment  difference  from  the  treatment 
group’s investment difference. Since the control group’s balance sheets were not affected by 
the currency depreciation, this difference in differences must exclude other events that could 
have influenced investment in the period.  
The differences-in-differences estimator therefore should isolate the impact of balance 
sheet  effects  on  investment,  unless  there  was  selection  bias  in  forming  the  two  groups. 
Selection  bias  may  suggest,  for  example,  distinct  trends  in  the  two  groups’  investment 
trajectories, independent of balance sheet effects. In the absence of due control, these pre-
existing trends would lead to a distorted estimate of the balance sheet effect.  
However, not all selection bias creates problems in the differences-in-differences method. 
Biases arising from variables that are constant over time (observed or not) are absorbed in the 
fixed  effects  of  the  differences-in-differences  model.  Examples  of  these  variables are  the 
industries, geographical locations and nationality of the firms. Relevant bias then is associated 
with selection variables that vary over time. The traditional way of handling pre-existing 
trends is to obtain the differences-in-differences estimator based on a regression model, in 
which specific variables are introduced linearly to monitor the trends of the treatment and 
control groups. Following Abadie (2005), we adopted this econometric specification: 
 
), , ( ) , ( ) 1 , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( t i t i D t i D t i X t i Y e a d t p m + × + × + × + × + =   (2) 
where Y(i,t) is the investment rate of firm i in period t.  
In equation (2), the firms are observed in a pre-treatment period (t=0) and in a post-
treatment period (t=1). D(i,t) = 1 is an indicator variable that takes value one if firm i is part 
of the treatment group (firms with currency mismatches just before the crisis) and the period 
is post-treatment (t=1). Since the firms are only exposed to losses in the period t=1, D(i,0) = 0 
for all of i, D(i,1) =1 for the treated firms and D(i,1)=0 for those not treated. While the 
variable D(i,1) takes into consideration differences in the treatment and control groups that 
are constant over time when measuring the average investment rates, variable D(i,t) captures 
the  impact  of  balance  sheet effects  on  this  difference.  The  coefficient a  is  therefore  the 
differences-in-differences estimator described in equation (1).
20 
In addition to the variables that recover the differences-in-differences estimator, equation 
(2) contains a trend component common to all firms, t, a random residual, e(i,t), and a vector 
X(i) of the firms’  characteristics. Inclusion of this vector controls possible  differences in 
                                                
20 For a more detailed discussion of the differences-in-differences models and possible extensions, see Meyer 
(1995).   
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investment trajectories of the treatment and control groups. For this, the firms’ characteristics 
should be correlated with investment and capture differences in the two groups.  
As selection variables, we included exports and imports, both normalized by total revenue, 
operating profit over total assets, the logarithm of total assets, the percentage of total debt 
over total assets and the investment rate. All these variables are measured in the pre-crisis 
period and potentially determine hedge and investment decisions.  
Export firms specifically should be less inclined to hedge, as their revenue’s response to a 
currency depreciation at least partially offsets any balance sheet losses; in contrast, importers 
are  more  inclined  to  hedge.  While  larger  and  more  profitable  firms  tend  to  have  more 
investment opportunities, accounting for their greater interest in hedging, they may be less 
subject  to  credit  restrictions  and  thus  less  inclined  to  hedge.  Likewise,  the  relationship 
between financial leverage, measured by the percentage of total debt over total assets, and 
hedge decisions can be ambiguous. Firms with greater financial risk may want to hedge in 
order to minimize cash flow volatility and avoid paying predicted bankruptcy costs (Smith 
and Stulz, 1985). However, if shareholders see their shares as options in firm value, may be 
optimal to leveraged firms to speculate (Ljungqvist, 1994). Lastly, including the investment 
rate of the base period affords a dynamic to the investment, which can be seen when there are 
adjustment costs (Laeven, 2001). 
In our sample, the firms are identified in each period t. We can therefore differentiate 
equation (2) with respect to t, obtaining: 
 
), , ( ) 1 , ( )' ( ) 0 , ( ) 1 , ( t i i D i X i Y i Y h a p d + × + × + = -      (3) 
where p = p(1) - p(0) and  ) , ( t i h =  ) 0 , ( ) 1 , ( i i e e - .   
 
 One  advantage  of  specification  (3)  is  that  it  clarifies  elimination  of  non-observable 
variables  that  are  constant  over  time.  Based  on  equation  (3),  we  adopted  the  following 
econometric  specification  to  estimate  the  impact  of  the  2002  currency  depreciation  on 
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In equation (4), the dependent variable captures the adjustment of the gross investment 
rate before and after the 2002 currency crisis. The year 2001 is the base period (pre-crisis). As 
we explained in the preceding section, the year 2002 was excluded from the sample because, 
among other reasons, the currency depreciation began in April of 2002, which could affect 
our results if the firms had made investments in the first quarter of the year. We therefore 
analyzed the average balance sheet effects on the firms’ investment rates in the year 2003. 
Variable  I(Mismatched)  is  the  equivalent  in  equation  (3)  of  the  term  D(i,1),  meaning  an 
indicator  variable  that  assumes  the  value  one  for  firms  in  the  group  with  large  currency 
mismatches in 2001 and zero in the opposite case. 
If balance sheet losses resulting from currency depreciations raised loan costs, we should 
observe a relative reduction in investments by firms with currency mismatches just before the 
crisis,  as  compared  with  firms  protected  from  currency  risk.  In  this  case,  the  estimated 
coefficient a should be negative. In the opposite case, a should be statistically equal to zero. 
In  these  tests,  we  used  clusters  at  firm  level  to  estimate  robust  standard  errors  to  serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity.
21  
Column (A) of Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of a simplified version of our 
differences-in-differences model, without the variables that controls selection biases. In this 
specification,  between  2001  and  2003  the  firms  with  currency  mismatches  invested  7.6 
percentage points less than firms that did not report foreign currency losses related to the 
crisis of 2002 (p-value of 0.077). The economic significance of these balance sheet effects is 
considerable given that the average investment rate of all firms was 8.1% in 2001. Introducing 
the variables that control selection biases, Column (B), the drop in investment by the firms 
with mismatches is even sharper and more significant. The firms with currency mismatches 
reduced their investment rates 8.1 percentage points more with a p-value of 0.004. Thus there 
is favorable evidence for the third generation models of currency crises: the balance sheet 
effects of currency depreciations led to substantially reduced investment. 
Among the vector of characteristics of the firms, only two variables significantly impacted 
the change in investment rates in the 2001-2003 period: exports over total revenues and the 
investment rate in the base period. The percentage of exports in total revenues positively 
affected the firms’ investment rates following the currency crisis, indicating competitiveness 
                                                
21 Bertrand et al. (2004) show that allowing an arbitrary covariance structure between the periods of time reduces 
problems  of  serial  correlation  in  studies  that  apply  the  differences-in-differences  method  with  over  50 
observations in the cross section.   
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gains.  The  negative  coefficient  of  the  investment  rate  in  the  base  period  may  signal  an 
adjustment in investment rates in the crisis scenario. 
To capture the endurance of the impact of balance sheet losses on investment rates, we re-
estimated our model substituting the year 2003 with 2004 as the post-crisis period. Column 
(C) shows that the negative balance sheets effects did not dissipate in the second year after the 
currency shock. Relative to the matched firms, the firms with currency mismatches reduced 
their investments between 2001 and 2004 by 5.5 percentage points more (p-value 0.077). 
Once again, the results indicate the relevance of balance sheet effects. 
 


























Note: This table contains the results of the least squares estimation of variants of equation (4) in the text. The dependent 
variable is the change in gross investment rate, measured as (K (t) – K (t–1) + depreciation) / K (t–1), in which the capital 
stock (K) is defined as fixed assets net of depreciation. The year 2001 is used as a base (pre-crisis). The year 2003 is used for 
the post-crisis data in Columns (A) and (B) and the year 2004 in Column (C). I(Mismatched) is an indicator variable that 
takes the value one for firms with currency mismatches exceeding 5.3% of their assets in 2001 and zero in the opposite case. 
Currency mismatch is defined as foreign currency debt net of foreign exchange assets and derivatives. The other control 
variables are fixed in the base year. Exports and imports were converted into domestic currency using the average exchange 
rate for each year. Total debt was calculated by the sum of the value of loans and financing in foreign currency and domestic 
currency, including debentures. Operating profit was calculated before tax and interest. Log of total assets is the logarithm of 
total  assets.  We  used  clusters  at  the  firm  level  to  estimate  standard  deviations  and  to  correct  possible  errors  of  serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity. We reported the p-values robust to errors of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in 




I(Mismatched) -0.076* -0.081*** -0.055*
(0.077) (0.004) (0.077)
Investment rate -0.867*** -0.855***
(0.000) (0.000)
Exports / Total revenue 0.180** 0.001
(0.023) (0.990)
Imports / Total revenue -0.023 -0.043
(0.853) (0.700)
Operational profit / Total asset 0.101 -0.008
(0.605) (0.980)
Log total assets  -0.003 -0.013*
(0.713) (0.072)
Total debt / Total asset -0.023 0.032
(0.742) (0.651)
Constant -0.011 0.097 0.277***
(0.749) (0.339) (0.009)
Obs. 217 217 197
R
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4.2.2 Propensity score matching  
As previously noted, one fundamental condition for testing the impact of balance sheet 
effects from currency depreciations is to control possible differences between treatment and 
control  group  firms  to  ensure  that  investment  changes  are  due  only  to  the  balance  sheet 
effects. Ideally the control group is random and identical to the treatment group except for the 
currency mismatch factor. However, building such a control group may not be possible for at 
least two reasons: first, finding firms with these characteristics is not likely; second, if they do 
exist, they would not be found through a random experiment given that the level of currency 
mismatches over assets is decided by firms. 
In the differences-in-differences method, possible biases in selecting the treatment and 
control groups are controlled by introducing a vector of characteristics of the firms (X). One 
cause for concern in this approach, however, is the linear specification assumption for vector 
X. In contrast, propensity score matching is a nonparametric method that also addresses the 
difficulties  of  building  a  random  control  group.  The  results are  based  on  the  conditional 
independence assumption. Applied to our study, this assumption says that depending on the 
set  of  selection  variables  included  in  the  model  (which  we  will  continue  to  call  X),  the 
expected investment rate of control group firms should equal the expected investment rate of 
treatment group firms if the crisis had not occurred. The challenge in matching is to find a set 
of X variables that will satisfy the conditional independence assumption. In practical terms, 
however, the larger the number of variables included in the model, the more difficult it is to 
find control group firms similar to the treatment group firms, and moreover, the greater the 
problem, which could limit the use of the matching method. One alternative for managing 
these problems is to use a function of the set of selection variables. Rosembaum and Rubin 
(1983, 1984) proved that, without loss of generality, we might substitute the X vector with the 
probability that, given X, the firm will be in the group with mismatches. This result motivates 
the propensity score matching: to find for each firm with currency mismatch a firm without 
currency mismatch with the closest probability of being in the group of mismatched firms, 
given vector X.  
The first step is to run a PROBIT model to find the probability the firms will be in the 
group with mismatches. For this method of building the sample of counterfactual firms to be 
valid, a second assumption is needed: every firm with currency mismatch (treatment group) 
has a counterpart in the group of firms without currency mismatching (control group), and any  
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firm is a possible participant.
22 In order to increase the chances of this assumption being 
satisfied, we restricted our sample to firms with and without mismatch whose propensity 
scores  (i.e.  their  probability  of  being  in  the  mismatched  group,  obtained  in  the  PROBIT 
model) were in the common support of the joint distribution.  
So T is the set of firms with unhedged foreign currency debts with a propensity score in 
the common support. The estimator of the average effect of the treatment on treated firms 
(i.e.,  the  balance  sheet  effect  of  currency  depreciation)  is  calculated  by  the  following 
equation: 
 
                    (5) 
 
where,  among  the  matched  firms,  j  is  the  firm  whose  propensity  score  is  closest  to  the 
mismatched firm i in the period t.
23  
With the exception of the investment rate, which is our variable of interest, we chose as 
selection variables the same ones used in the differences-in-differences model. Additionally, 
we included indicator variables for each of the seventeen sectors identified in Table 1.
24 The 
sectors may be important in determining the firms’ currency mismatches. For example, firms 
that did not export but whose business involves tradeable goods could also benefit from the 
change in relative prices following the currency crisis. As such they could choose to assume 
greater currency risk than other firms.  
Table 7 presents the results for each year of our sample. Panel A shows the results of the 
PROBIT. Size and financial leverage are important selection factors. The coefficients of these 
variables were positive and significant in all the years analyzed. These results suggest that 
large  and  more  leveraged  firms  have  a  greater  probability  of  having  large  currency 
mismatches.  The  coefficients  of  the  other  variables  had  the  expected  signs,  but  did  not 
significantly affect the probability of the firms being in the group with mismatches.  
Panel B of Table 7 shows that matching the treatment group with the control group brings 
a significantly lower average investment rate in the two years following the crisis of 2002 
among  the  firms  with  currency  mismatches,  as  compared  to  the  firms  without  currency 
mismatches. More precisely, while the difference in the investment rate of both groups was 
                                                
22 In formal terms, this assumption corresponds to 0 < Prob {I(Mismatched)=1|Xit)} <1, with Xit being the 
selection variables included in the model. 
23 This estimator is known in the literature as an average treatment on the treated (ATT). For a more detailed 
description of the matching method and use of a propensity score, see Blundell and Dias (2002).  
24 In the differences-in-differences model, these variables were incorporated into the fixed effects. 
[ ]
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not significant in 2001 (only 0.5 percentage points), the investment rate of the group with 
currency mismatches was 10.1 percentage points in 2003 and 6 percentage points in 2004 less 
than the group without mismatches.  
 
Table 7: Balance Sheet Effects on Investment: Propensity Score Matching 
 
 
Note: Panel A presents the results of a PROBIT regression to calculate the probability that each firm in our 
sample would be in the group of firms with mismatches. Currency mismatch is defined as foreign currency debt 
net of foreign exchange assets and derivatives. The firms with mismatches are those with currency mismatches 
exceeding 5.3% of their assets in 2001. We chose this cutoff value for firms to be included in the group with 
mismatches so that the group without mismatches would have an average level of currency mismatches over 
assets equal to zero. In Panel B, Matchings is the size of a sample matched between firms with and without 
currency mismatches. The matched firms selected are those with the closest propensity score after the sample 
was  restricted  to  firms  in  the  common  support.  Investment/K-1  (Mismatched)  and  Investment/K-1  (Not 
Mismatched) are, respectively, the average investment rates of the groups with and without currency mismatches 
in the matched sample. Investment Difference/K-1 is the average effect of the treatment on the treated firms, 
determined by the difference in the investment rates of the mismatched and matched firms. The confidence 
intervals (1, 5 and 10%) were calculated by bootstrapping through 1000 replications. The coefficients significant 
to 10, 5 and 1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Variables / Year 2000 2001 2003 2004
Exports / Total revenue 0.44 0.25 0.20 0.91
(0.527) (0.714) (0.761) (0.208)
Imports / Total revenue -0.33 -0.91 -1.48 -1.43
(0.821) (0.524) (0.287) (0.300)
Operational profit / Total asset -1.83 -0.53 -0.45 0.04
(0.259) (0.663) (0.686) (0.973)
Log total assets  0.22*** 0.12* 0.13* 0.19***
(0.006) (0.084) (0.070) (0.015)
Total debt / Total asset 4.55*** 3.15*** 2.77*** 2.50***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -4.36*** -2.96*** -2.84*** 2.95***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 218 232 217 196
Pseudo-R
2 0.34 0.24 0.20 0.19
Chi
2 (p-value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2000 2001 2003 2004
Investment rate (Mismatched) 0.102 0.072 0.0146 0.058
Investment rate (Matched) 0.108 0.077 0.116 0.119
Investment Difference -0.006 -0.005 -0.101*** -0.060**
Confidential Interval (1%) (-0.164;0.127) (-0.162;0.072) (-0.256;-0.022) (-0.264;0.005)
Confidential Interval (5%) (-0.123;0.092) (-0.137;0.051) (-0.230;-0.050) (-0.354;-0.013)
Confidential Interval (10%) (-0.090;0.073) (-0.094;0.040) (-0.245;-0.064) (-0.246;-0.022)
Panel A: PROBIT
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching 
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In summary, the results found in this subsection corroborate the results obtained by using 
the differences-in-differences estimators: the balance sheet losses associated with the currency 
depreciation of 2002 negatively affected firms’ investment.  
 
4.2.3 Robustness of the results  
The results described in the previous subsections suggest that the currency depreciation of 
2002 caused firms with large currency mismatches to reduce their post-crisis investment more 
than firms that did not report losses. We attribute this reduction to balance sheet effects. 
However, our results could have occurred due to other factors not related to the post-crisis 
balance sheet effects. In this section we investigate some of these possibilities. 
A potential problem with the differences-in-differences approach is the assumption that 
the crisis affects the treatment and control groups equally. If the groups presented different 
temporal  trends,  our  results  could  merely  reflect  these  trend  differences.  These  different 
trends occur when the treatment and control groups have distinct characteristics (possibly not 
observable) that provoke different reactions to the shocks.  
To address this possibility, we tested for evidence of greater investment reductions by the 
firms with mismatches in a period without balance sheet losses. For this, we re-estimated 
equation (3) using the year 2000 as the base year and the year 2001 as a fictitious post-crisis 
period. If the negative balance sheet effects found in the differences-in-differences estimation 
resulted  from  the  groups’  different  trends,  we  would  expect  to  find  greater  investment 
reductions by the mismatched firms than by the matched firms in this “falsification exercise.” 
The results described in Table 8 show that this did not occur. In the 2000-2001 period, the 
difference  in  the  treatment  and control  group  investment  rates  was  not  significant  in  our 
differences-in-differences model.
25  
We also analyzed the robustness of the results of the propensity score matching in relation 
to inclusion of the following selection variables: asset tangibility, defined as the proportion of 
long-term assets, and two binary variables indicating whether the firms were, respectively, 
multinationals  or  with  shares  listed  overseas  through  American  Depositary  Receipts. 
Additionally, we re-estimated the model excluding the sector indicator variables. In all these 
alternatives, the negative balance sheet effects remained significant at 5% in the year 2003 
(results not described in the tables). 
 
                                                
25 Table 7, described in the previous subsection, also shows that propensity score matching indicated no 
significant differences in the investment rates of the treatment and control groups in 2000 and 2001.  
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Note: This table contains the results of the least squares estimation of variants of equation (4) in the text, except 
for the period analyzed. In this falsification exercise, we used a period without currency crises. The year 2000 
was used as a base period and the year 2001 as the post fictitious crisis period. The dependent variable is the 
change in gross investment rate, measured as (K (t) – K (t–1) + depreciation) / K (t–1), in which capital stock 
(K) is defined as fixed assets net of depreciation. I(Mismatched) is an indicator variable that takes the value one 
for firms with currency  mismatches exceeding 5.3%  of their assets in  2001 and zero in the  opposite case. 
Currency mismatch is defined as foreign currency debt net of foreign exchange assets and derivatives. The other 
control variables are fixed in the base year. Exports and imports were converted into domestic currency using the 
average exchange rate for each year. Total debt was calculated by the sum of the value of loans and financing in 
foreign currency and domestic currency, including debentures. Operating profit was calculated before tax and 
interest. We used clusters at the firm level to estimate standard deviations and to correct possible errors of serial 
correlation  and  heteroscedasticity.  We  reported  the  p-values  robust  to  errors  of  serial  correlation  and 






Exports / Total revenue 0.250
(0.186)
Imports / Total revenue 0.286
(0.329)
Operational profit / Total asset 1.700*
(0.098)
Log total assets  -0.027
(0.231)
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5. Competitiveness Effect  
In the differences-in-differences approach described in the previous section, the evidence 
of balance sheet effects comes from a comparison of investments by firms with unhedged 
foreign debt (treatment group) and firms without currency mismatches (control group). These 
two groups were formed in such a way that balance sheet losses were significant only for the 
treatment group. Note, however, that the reliability of the results depends on the currency 
mismatch measure, which was the basis for forming the treatment and control groups.  
To ensure that the reduction in investment was attributable to the negative balance sheet 
effects and not due to poorly formed treatment and control groups, in this section we test the 
balance  sheet  effects  on  a  more  homogenous  subset  of  our  sample:  export  firms.  The 
advantage of this alternative test is that currency depreciation may affect export firms through 
both the balance sheet channel and the competitiveness channel. Depreciation increases the 
competitiveness of goods sold internationally, raising exporters’ profit in domestic currency.
26 
In this case, the logic of third generation models predicts that investments by export firms will 
rise due to competitiveness gains, and also that this increase will be lower for exporters with 
unhedged foreign currency debt because of the negative balance sheet effect. 
Among the sample firms, 107 reported positive exports net of imports in December of 
2001. Of these 107 exporters, 55 had unhedged foreign currency debt.  
Initially  we  test  whether,  in  fact,  the  depreciation  of  2002  increased  exporters’ 
competitiveness, raising their net sales revenue more than that of firms that did not export, as 
predicted in conventional open economy models. For this we again used the differences-in-
differences approach. However, here our treatment group consisted of 107 firms with positive 
exports net of imports in 2001. The control group consisted of 125 firms with positive imports 
net  of  exports  or  no  overseas  trade  in  2001.  These  two  groups  help  us  to  estimate  the 
competitiveness effect of the currency depreciation in the usual way: comparing changes in 
net revenue (before and after the crisis) of exporting and non-exporting firms.  
Column (A) of Table 9 shows that the net revenue of the exporting group rose 16.8% 
more than the net revenue of the other firms in the 2001-2003 period. This result was highly 
significant (p-value of 0.000). Column (B) shows that there were no significant differences in 
revenue gains between the exporters with currency mismatches and those without. Therefore, 
we have significant evidence that the revenue of export firms, both with and without currency 
                                                
26 The extent of the competitiveness effect depends on the pass through from currency depreciation to domestic 
prices. In general, empirical studies find that this pass through is incomplete, which ensures competitiveness 
gains. See, for example, Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and Goldfajn and Werlang (2000).   
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mismatches; rise more than that of firms that did not export in the aftermath of currency 
depreciations. 
 
Table 9: Balance Sheet and Competitiveness Effects 
 
 
Note: This table contains the results of the least squares estimation of variants of equation (5) in the text. In 
Columns (A) and (B), the dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of revenue net of sales tax, and in 
Columns (C) through (E) it is the change in gross investment rate, measured as (K (t) – K (t–1) + depreciation) / 
K (t–1), in which the capital stock (K) is defined as fixed assets net of depreciation. The year 2001 was used as a 
base (pre-crisis), and the year 2003 was used for post-crisis data. I(Exporters) is an indicator variable that takes 
the value one for firms with positive net exports in 2001 and zero in the opposite case. I(Exporters*Mismatched) 
is an indicator variable that takes the value one for firms with positive net exports in 2001 and with currency 
mismatches exceeding 5.3% of their assets in 2001. Currency mismatch is defined as foreign currency debt net 
of foreign exchange assets and derivatives. The other control variables are fixed in the base year. Exports and 
imports were converted into domestic currency using the average exchange rate for each year. Total debt was 
calculated by the sum of the value of loans and financing in foreign currency and domestic currency, including 
debentures. Operating profit was calculated before tax and interest. Log of total assets is the logarithm of total 
assets. We used clusters at the firm level to estimate standard deviations and to correct possible errors of serial 
correlation  and  heteroscedasticity.  We  reported  the  p-values  robust  to  errors  of  serial  correlation  and 
heteroscedasticity in parentheses. The coefficients significant to 10, 5 and 1% are indicated by *, ** and ***, 
respectively. 
 
According to the logic of third generation models, this competitiveness gain should ease 
credit restrictions and increase investments by exporters as compared to non-exporters. One 
could  argue,  however,  that  any  investment  model  based  on  relative  prices  could  predict 
increased exporter investments, but the predictions of these two types of models could be 
different  if  we  compare  the  rise  in  investments  by  exporters  with  and  without  currency 
mismatches. The third generation models also predict that the rise in exporter investments 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
I(Exporters) 0.168*** 0.146*** 0.072* 0.164*** 0.110***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.098) (0.001) (0.001)




Operational profit / Total asset 0.079
(0.686)
Log total assets  -0.002
(0.820)
Total debt / Total asset -0.063
(0.320)
Constant -0.037 -0.037 -0.078** -0.078** 0.057
(0.173) (0.174) (0.024) (0.024) (0.592)
Obs. 217 217 217 217 217
R
2 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.70
D(Investment rate) D(Log Net Revenue) 
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would be less significant for those with unhedged foreign currency debt and this is different 
than predictions of investment models based on relative prices.  
In order to test this additional prediction of third generation models, we compared the 
difference in investment rates (before and after the crisis of 2002) among export firms with 
and without currency mismatches. In this year, the 55 export firms with currency mismatches 
before the crisis constituted the treatment group, while the remaining exporters constituted the 
control group.  






The dependent variable continues to be the variation in gross investment rate for each firm 
i  in  period  t.  The  variables  of  interest  now  are  the  indicator  variables  I(Exporters)  and 
I(Exporters*Mismatched). The first takes the value one for the firms with net exports in 2001 
and zero in  the  opposite  case. The second  assumes the  value one  only for  the  subset  of 
exporters in the group of firms with mismatches in 2001.  
The coefficient b measures the difference in investment rates of the export and non-export 
firms  between  2001  and  2003;  this  is  our  measure  of  the  competitiveness  effect.  If  the 
competitiveness gains caused by the currency depreciations did in fact increase the firms’ 
investments, we should expect a positive b. The coefficient a measures the difference in 
investment rates between exporters with mismatches and those without: our measure of the 
balance sheet effect. If the losses provoked by currency depreciation increased the financing 
costs  of  exporters  with  mismatches  more  than  that  of  exporters  without  mismatches,  we 
should expect a negative a. If the balance sheet effects did not cause exporters with currency 
mismatches to have more credit restriction in comparison, then a should be statistically equal 
to zero. 
In  Column  (C)  of  Table  9,  we  show  that  the  competitiveness  effect  of  the  currency 
depreciation of 2002 also positively affected investment. The investment rates of exporters 
rose  7.2  percentage  points  more  than  that  of  non-exporters  (p-value  of  0.098).  This 
competitiveness gain would have been even greater if there had not been exporters with large 
currency mismatches just before the crisis. Column (D) shows that in 2003 exporters with 
currency mismatches just before the crisis invested 17.6 percentage points less than exporters 
it i i i
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without mismatches compared with pre-crisis levels. The group of matched exporters invested 
16.4 percentage points more than the non-export firms. Both of the results were significant at 
1%.  Since  in  this model  the  change  in average  investment  rate  of  the  sample  firms  was 
negative by 7.8 percentage points (captured by the constant d), we have evidence that the 
average investment rate of the exporters rose 8.6 percentage points between 2001 and 2003. 
On the other side, the investment rates of the exporters with mismatches, on average, fell 9 
percentage points.
27  
Lastly, we re-estimated the model introducing the variables that control selection biases. 
The results, described in Column (E), did not change qualitatively. The balance sheet effect 
impacted investment more than the competitiveness effect for firms influenced by these two 
effects: the exporters with currency mismatches. The difference in investment rates of export 
and non-export firms was 11 percentage points. In the exporting group, the investment rates 
of those with mismatches fell 12.5 percentage points more than the rate of those without 
mismatches. The only significant selection variable in this model is the investment rate of the 
base period.  
 In  summary,  we  may  extract  two  basic  conclusions  from  this  section.  First,  that 
competitiveness gains are quite substantial after dramatic currency depreciation. Second, the 
increase in revenues for exporters was not enough to fully counteract the negative effects of 
balance sheet losses. The natural hedge provided by exports was not sufficient.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In  third  generation  models  of  currency  crises,  the  balance  sheet  losses  of  firms  with 
unhedged foreign currency debt exercise a central role in explaining the recessionary effects 
of the crises. However, empirical evidence that tests the relevance of these models is not 
conclusive. While in some countries there is evidence that having debt in foreign currency 
lowers investment by firms following currency depreciation, in others the evidence is not 
significant or even shows increased investment.  
In this article, we test the importance of this balance sheet channel, combining a more 
precise, firm-level measure of currency mismatches with an analysis focusing on the Brazilian 
crisis of 2002. To isolate the balance sheet effects from other macroeconomic events that 
could have influenced investment, we identified two groups of firms: the treatment group, 
                                                
27  The  change  in  the  investment  rate  of  export  firms  was  calculated  by  the  sum  of  coefficients  d and b in 
equation (6). In the case of exporters with mismatches, the change is calculated by the sum of coefficients d, a  
and  b.  
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which was formed of firms with currency mismatches just before the crisis of 2002 and thus 
reported balance sheet losses; and the control group, which was formed of firms that did not 
have currency mismatches. While the treatment group’s investment changes (before and after 
the crisis) should reflect both the balance sheet effect and other effects of the 2002 crisis, the 
control group’s changes should reflect only these other effects, which impacted all firms alike. 
Therefore,  the  difference  in the changes in these two groups gives us an estimate  of the 
balance sheet effect of currency depreciation on the firms’ investment rates.  
We  found  that  firms  with  currency  mismatches  reduced  investments  more  than  firms 
without mismatches an average of 8.1 percentage points the first year after the currency shock 
and 5.5 percentage points the second year. These negative balance sheet effects were also 
quite substantial when we used propensity score matching to select a sample of firms without 
currency mismatches that was most similar to the firms with currency mismatches just before 
the crisis.  
Lastly, we conducted a joint test of the balance sheet and competitiveness effects of the 
currency depreciation on investment by analyzing the investment changes of exporters before 
and after the currency crisis of 2002. The results show that the exporters’ investment rates 
rose 11 percentage points more than non-exporters’ investments. However, confirming the 
importance of the negative balance sheet effects, the exporters with currency mismatches 
invested 12.5 percentage points less than exporters that did not report balance sheet losses 
related to the currency depreciation.  
In summary, the evidence for the Brazilian currency crisis of 2002 shows that the negative 
balance sheet effects at least partially reversed the competitiveness effect of the currency 
depreciations, thus  capable  of making them contractionary,  as third generation models  of 
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